In a shocking development yesterday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued a per-curiam, single-sentence order purporting to “clarify” its prior stay of the compliance date for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) payday loan rule. The new order provides that the rule will go into effect on March 30, 2025, 286 days after the Supreme Court entered its judgment in the CFSA lawsuit and not 286 days after the Fifth Circuit’s subsequent decision not to rehear the case en banc. The new order does not even attempt an explanation on how it conforms with the earlier order that the rule would be stayed “until 286 days after resolution of the appeal.”

On November 18, the plaintiff trade groups in Community Financial Services Association of America, Ltd.(CFSA) v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) filed an Opposed Motion for Clarification of Stay Pending Appeal asking the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to clarify that its stay of the compliance date for the CFPB’s payday loan rule extends until the time for filing a new petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court has expired or, if the petition is filed, until the Supreme Court finally disposes of the case. At a minimum, the trade groups ask the Fifth Circuit to clarify that its existing stay expires 286 days after the court’s recent issuance of its mandate (that is, August 25, 2025) and not on March 30, 2025.

On November 12, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a request from Community Financial Services Association of America (CFSA) and the Consumer Services Alliance of Texas to reopen their legal challenge against the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) payday loan rule. This decision effectively clears the path for the rule to be implemented.

In Heckman v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower court decision refusing to enforce the Ticketmaster arbitration provision in a purported consumer antitrust class action brought against Ticketmaster and Live Nation. In reaching its decision, the panel concluded that the arbitration agreement in question was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Going further, the panel went out of its way to hold, “as an alternative and independent ground,” that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not apply to the special multi-party arbitrations contemplated for mass arbitrations by the arbitration agreement in question.

A proposed class action lawsuit has been filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against EarnIn, a FinTech provider of Earned Wage Access services, alleging that its optional fees and tips constitute hidden interest payments. The complaint claims that EarnIn’s practices violate Georgia’s Payday Loan Act and the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA).

In a recent decision, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied a retailer’s motion to compel individual arbitration of a claim brought in a putative class action lawsuit. The complaint alleges that the retailer used deceptive sales tactics to induce the plaintiff to make an unnecessary online purchase. The court denied the retailer’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that a unilateral modification provision in its terms and conditions rendered the arbitration agreement illusory.

On May 30, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously decided Cantero, reaffirming and elaborating on the Barnett Bank preemption standard, and remanding the case to the Second Circuit for further proceedings. Cantero addressed whether a New York law requiring the payment of at least 2% per annum interest on mortgage escrow deposits was preempted by federal law as to national banks. The Supreme Court held that the Second Circuit erred when it failed to apply the preemption standard articulated in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, which was incorporated by Congress into the Dodd-Frank Act. The Court rejected the lower court’s holding “that federal law preempts any state law that ‘purports to exercise control over a federally granted banking power,’ regardless of ‘the magnitude of its effects.’” The Court also rejected the approach argued by the petitioners, explaining it would “yank the preemption standard to the opposite extreme, and would preempt virtually no non-discriminatory state laws that apply to both state and national banks.”

On June 18, a Colorado federal court granted the plaintiff trade groups’ motion for a preliminary injunction, effectively halting the enforcement of Colorado’s H.B. 1229 with respect to loans made by out-of-state state-chartered banks.

In this episode of The Consumer Finance Podcast, Chris Willis is joined by Troutman Pepper Partner Jeremy Rosenblum and Neil Currie, vice president at the American Arbitration Association (AAA). They discuss the phenomenon of mass arbitration and the recent revisions to the AAA’s rules to address this. The conversation covers the new AAA rules, the fee structure, and the benefits of using AAA over other arbitration administrators. They also discuss strategies for drafting arbitration clauses to avoid the challenges of mass arbitrations. The episode provides valuable insights into the complexities of mass arbitration and offers practical advice for businesses navigating this challenging landscape.

On May 2, JAMS announced its new Mass Arbitration Procedures and Guidelines and Mass Arbitration Procedures Fee Schedule (together, the Procedures), with the express goal to “facilitate the fair, expeditious and efficient resolution of Mass Arbitrations” and implicit intent to reduce the administrative burden and onerous fees of mass arbitrations, as well as the delay and potential unfairness to the parties. While effective immediately, the Procedures only apply if the parties have agreed to their application in a pre- or post-dispute written agreement. This limitation significantly decreases the effectiveness of the Procedures as a tool for hedging risks and limiting the high costs of mass arbitration.